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Most people, philosophers included, seem 
to feel that we are obviously justified in 
sacrificing animals to fulfill human inte-
rests and that, consequently, calls for libe-
rating animals must be mistaken. '!his feel-
ing places a heavy burden of proof, if that 
is the proper term, on those who would libe-
rate animals from the routine sacrifice of 
their interests for our benefit. Some advo-, 
cates of animal liberation, such as Tom Re-
gan, in '!he Case for Animal Rights, [1] have. 
tried to shoulder this burden by developing 
an extensive, impressive, systematic animal 
liberation ethic. I do not have a novel, 
systematic animal liberation ethic of my own 
to offer. Rather, I propose to develop some 
everyday rrnral concerns which, if considered 
impartially, indicate that liberating animals 
is what w: oVght (ITQrally) to do. Hopefully, 
this indication can be made strong enough to 
rerrnve the burden of proof from the shoulders 
of the advocates of animal liberation and to 
place it on the shoulders of those who oppose 
that liberation. Richard Rorty has written 
that "philosophical discussion, by the nature 
of the subject, is such that the best one can 
hope for is to put the burden of proof on 
one's opponent. " [2] The analysis of this 
essay will not even try to prove Rorty wrong 
about that. 
'!his analysis will be carried out em-
ploying the following three, platitudinous 
goals of everyday rrnrality: 
developing noral character, so that our 
actions will be based on compassion, respect, 
courage, and other rrnral virtues, 
both reducing t.~e suffering in life and 
otherwise making life rrnre enjoyable and 
fulfilling, and 
insuring that goods, opportunities, pun-
ishments, and rewards are distributed fairly. 
What I propose to do is to discover the rrnral 
value of liberating animals in a pragmatic 
manner: if liberating animals would better 
advance us toward accomplishing these three 
rrnral goals than would continuing routinely 
to sacrifice their interests for our benefit, 
then that indicates that we ought. (rrnrally) 
to liberate them. '!hat is the m:>dest case to 
be made here. (Henceforth, "consuming ani-
mals" will be used to refer to the many ways 
in which we routinely sacrifice \heir inte-
rests for our benefit.) 
I 
In an earlier article, I argued that one 
of the shortcanings of the IIDral concept of 
"personhood" (roughly, a being with IIDral 
rights) and of the humanist principle which 
holds that all and only human beings are 
persons in this IIDral sense is that rather 
than suggesting that IIDrality should be 
treated as a pervasive way of life, they 
suggest that IIDrality is merely a limited set 
of restrictions on the actions of beings 
which are basically free to do pretty much 
what they can and want to do.[3] Liberating 
animals would help overcome this limitation 
by extending IIDral concern and such concepts 
as rights and justice into areas from which 
humanism has excluded them. Decisions about 
what to eat or wear and what sorts of experi-
ments to conduct, which are currently not 
considered IIDral issues, would become, 
through animal liberation, situations calling 
for compassion, altruism, respect for the 
interests and rights of others, a sense of 
fairness, a willingness to stand up and take 
risks in defense of those who cannot defend 
themselves, and so forth. '!hus, on the sur-
face of it, it seems clear that liberating 
animals is one thing we ought to do in order 
to work toward attaining the goal of develop-
ing IIDral character through treating IIDrality 
as a pervasive way of life. 
It might be objected that this is mere 
appearance. It could be argued that our 
traditional humane ethic already directs us 
to be IIDrally concerned about the treatment 
of animals. It would then seem to follow 
that what animal liberation seeks is not an 
extension of IIDral concern into new areas but 
simply different answers in long-established 
areas of IIDral concern. 
SUch a rebuttal would be mistaken. '!his 
is because our traditional, humane ethic has 
basically limited IIDral concern about our use 
of animals to questions concerning the hand-
ling and processing of animals. For example, 
humane concern in agriculture is directed 
toward the procedures for transporting and 
slaughtering food animals, not toward whether 
we ought (IIDrally) to be raising animals for 
food at all. In general, our traditional, 
humane ethic does not raise questions about 
whether or not we ought (IIDrally) to treat 
animals basically as resources for fulfilling 
our interests.' However, such questions are 
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precisely the ones raised by the animal libe-
ration movement. Consequently, liberating 
animals would extend our moral =ncern beyond 
traditional limits. 
It might be objected that, nonetheless, 
liberating animals would not represent a 
fundamental moral improvement here, because 
animal liberation carries on the "us vs. 
them, " line-drawing attitude toward moral 
rights which is the fundamental problem with 
humanism. Liberating animals would involve 
drawing the line further out, so that not 
only hunans but all sentient beings would be 
protected against hunan selfishness by moral 
rights, but it =uld be argued that the ba-
sic, "we're in, they're out" mentality re-
mains the same from humanism to animal libe-
ration and that, =nsequently, all that has 
been done is to extend a bit that morally 
protected oasis in the desert of human sel-
fishness. 
This rebuttal is also mistaken. Animal 
liberation ethics do not continue the "in's 
vs. out's" mentality characteristic of human-
ism, because animal liberation does not share 
humanism's basic tenet, em¢asized in its 
many battles against tribal, religious, ra-
cial, etc., chauvinisms, that, fundamentally, 
everyone should be treated the same. Focus-
ing on nonnal, human adults, humanism pro-
jects an image of all holders of moral rights 
as beings which seek to be autonaoous agents 
leading enjoyable, fulfilling lives in human 
society. In this way, humanism projects the 
image of moral rights-holders =nstituting a 
fundamentally haoogeneous group which =n-· 
trasts starkly with the group of non-persons. 
Of =urse, animals are among those who clear-
ly do not seek to lead enjoyable, fulfilling 
lives as autonomous agents in human society. 
Consequently, by extending moral rights to 
them, we would severely =mpranise the sup-
posed homogeneity of the group of moral 
rights-holders. We would also undercut the 
starkness of the =ntrast between those 
beings which possess moral rights and those 
which still would not, e. g • , plants and ri-
vers. 
Most, if not all, wild animals seem to 
be quite =ntent without any contact whatso-
ever with human society. While these animals 
seek autonomy, in the sense of freedom to 
pursue their own way of life, they do not 
seek to be agents in human society. This 
would have to be taken into ac=unt in moral 
"calculations" of the general welfare and in 
principles for respecting the rights of 
others. Bringing wild animals into the moral 
arena would require giving diversity a much 
more fundamental place in that arena. Ex-
tending moral rights to domesticated animals 
would lead to the same result. These animals 
have been made to be dependent on us; so, 
they cannot share the interest in indepen-
dence had by wild animals. Furthenrore, 
since they will never become normal, hunan 
adults, they cannot share our goal of being 
autonomous agents in hunan society. They 
will always be dependent on us in many of the 
ways children temporarily are. Consequently, 
liberating danesticated animals would require 
recognizing that enjoyable, fulfilling but 
non-autonaoous lives can be the goal of moral 
rights-holders and that those in p::lWer, i.e. , 
nonnal, human adults, have a permanent obli-
gation of stewardship to insure that the 
interests of domesticated animals, like those 
of children, are protected. Thus, in =n-
trast to the basic homogeneity of moral 
rights-holders envisioned by ..humanism, libe-
rating both wild and domesticated animals 
would require recognizing and making moral 
provisions for the basic diversity of the in-
terests of the group of moral rights-holders. 
Similarly, given the earth's limited 
resources and the many competing interests 
among animals, including ourselves, how to 
establish priority among rights would becane 
a more common problem, if we expanded the 
domain of moral rights-holders to include 
other animals. For example, it would become 
important to distinguish not only different 
interests, such as interests in mating and in 
voting, but also different degrees of inte-
rest, such as interests of crucial importance 
to the quality of life, like adequate space 
to move about, and peri¢eral interests, such 
as having a vacation home. [4J Thus, working 
out the details of our moral principles, 
procedures, and practices following the libe-
ration of animals would require scrapping the 
"us vs. them" mentality and the emphasis on 
so-called "differences in kind" which are 
characteristic of humanism and developing a 
"differences of degree" oriented morality and 
mentality which would em¢asize our member-
ship in a fundamentally diverse community of 
interests. Consequently, animal liberation 
projects a fundamental change in our moral 
attitude away from the line-drawing attitude 
which canpromises the moral value of human-
ism. Since this change involves expanding 
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our arena of IlOral concern, it would help 
advance us toward our goal of developing 
IlOral character through treating IlOrality as 
a pervasive way of life. 
However, it might be objected, finally, 
that we have been wrong in supposing that 
treating IlOrality as a pervasive way of life 
is involved with our COImIOn goals of IlOrali-
ty. After all, it could be argued, there are 
some issues that, except under the IlOSt ex-
traordinary of circumstances, simply are not 
IlOral issues, such as deciding which brand of 
personal computer to buy. FurtherllOre, it is 
not always selfish to pursue one's awn inte-
rests without worrying about the well-being 
of others. It is not always wrong to indulge 
in the purchase of a well-tailored suitor a 
fine wine, even if people somewhere in the· 
world are ill-clothed and hungry. It would 
not be unreasonable to claim that a world in 
which all decisions had to be treated as 
IlOrally serious ones would not be an ideal or 
even a desirable world. Consequently, it 
could be argued that treating IlOrality as a 
pervasive way of life is a gross, undesirable 
exaggeration of everyday IlOrality's emphasis 
on developing IlOral character. 
en the other hand, as I have argued 
elsewhere, pursuing IlOrality as a pervasive 
way of life is what characterizes fully IlOral 
agents and distinguishes (some of) the vir-
tuous deeds of humans from the virtuous deeds 
of animals. [5] Thus, to borrow Kant's termi-
nology, postulating that IlOrality should be 
treated as a pervasive way of life in order 
better to attain our IlOral goal of developing 
IlOral character is not without its practical 
reason. What the supposed reductio counter-
examples of the previous paragraph indicate 
is merely that "llOrality as a way of life" 
ItUlst be interpreted in a way which 
is compatible with the limited resources 
of our environment and the diversity within 
human nature, 
recognizes that IlOral principles are 
artifacts we create in order to make life 
more enjoyable and fulfilling, rather than 
being hard task-rnasters adding to the burdens 
of life, and 
recognizes that we need not be aiming at 
IlOral sainthood in order to be IlOral. 
That such an interpretation of IlOrality 
is possible is indicated by the lives of many 
decent, ordinary people, such as Frank Furil-
10 of "Hill Street Blues, Sophie Zawiatowska 
in "Sophie's Choice," and Mac Sledge in "Ten-· 
der Mercies." These lives indicate that a 
sense of responsibility and concern for the 
well-being of others can embue, structure, 
and corne to identify one's life without be-
corning obsessions which deprive life of plea-
sure and a reasonable balance of the self-
sacrificing and the dutiful with the self-
indulgent and the whimsical. Regarding IlOr-
ality as a pervasive way of life does not 
require or even project the elimination of 
the non--rnoral; rather, it merely requires 
having moral concern be one's basic attitude, 
with non--rnoral concerns being pursued within 
the parameters established by that moral 
concern. This is the reverse of the restric-
ted conception of morality projected by hu-
manism. 
Thus, although the issue is not a simple 
one, it seems fair to conclude that until, if 
ever, some argument to the contrary is pro-
duced, the goal of developing moral character 
through treating morality as a pervasive way 
of life would be better pursued by liberating 
animals than by our continuing to consume 
them. This is the kernel of truth that lies 
in the popular argument, put forth by Aquinas 
and Kant, among others, that we ought to 
treat animals decently in order to avoid 
developing the habit of insensitivity to the 
interests of others. Advocates of animal 
liberation have often and properly objected 
to the anthropocentric form this argument 
usually takes: we should treat animals de-
cently, because if we do not, that will in-
cline us not to deal decently with humans, 
which is where the real moral issue lies. 
However, from a deontological viewpoint, this 
argument need not be developed in this an-
thropocentric manner. From this viewpoint, 
compassion, courage, honesty, dutifulness, 
and the other moral virtues are as intrinsic-
ally valuable as the human pleasure and ful-
fillment they may produce. Consequently, the 
developnent of these virtues does not have to 
be tied to consequences for human enjoynv:mt 
and fulfillment in order to be of moral val-
ue. It follows that the argument for the 
moral value of liberating animals based on 
the developnent of moral character can be 
developed, as it has been here, in a non-
M~~ 
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II 
The second of our everyday IOOral goals 
is the consequential one of reducing the 
suffering in life and otherwise making life 
IOOre enjoyable and fulfilling. "Life" here 
refers not merely to being organically func-
tional but also to being sentient, and it 
refers to all sentient life forms indiscrimi-
nately. That is, of course, not quite the 
meaning of the tenn in everyday IOOrality. 
While "life" does not there refer merely to 
being organically functional, it does not 
refer indiscriminately to all sentient 
beings; rather, in everyday IOOrality, "life" 
refers primarily to human life, with non-
human animal life being accorded only secon-
dary, humane consideration, at IOOSt. Such 
COIm1OIl expressions as "the sanctity of life" 
and "pro-life" clearly refer only to human 
life. However, there are two reasons for 
setting aside this anthropocentric use of 
"life" in this context. First, our rroral 
concern here is not with reducing or increas-
ing things that are uniquely human. Suffer-
ing, enjoyment, and fulfillment are things 
that we share with other animals. Second, 
even though our humane considerations may be 
secondary, they express some current, cammon 
recognition that at least this second of our 
rroral goals concerns other species of sen-
tient beings. Consequently, the anthropocen-
tric use of "life" in everyday rrorality can-
not be interpreted as a conceptual obstacle 
to the possibility that our ordinary rroral 
concern with reducing suffering in life and 
otherwise rraking life IOOre enjoyable and 
fulfilling may be better served by liberating 
animals than by continuing to consume them. 
Now, it is indisputable that our consum-
ing animals causes them to suffer greatly. 
For example, they suffer the confinement of 
factory farms, the distress of induced dis-
eases in laboratories, and" the trauma of 
being caught in leg-hold traps. They also 
suffer, in the vast majority of cases, the 
loss of the remainder of lives that would 
have held rrore enjoyment and fulfillment than 
distress and frustration, or, at least, lives 
that could have held such a positive result 
with our assistance or even just without our 
interference. (Henceforth, "lives worth liv-
ing" will be used to refer to such lives, and 
"frustration" will refer not only to certain 
unpleasant experiences but also to suffering 
this sort of loss.) 
On the other hand, consuming animals 
contributes to fulfilling our interests, 
e.g., in focx:1, medical inventions, and enter-
tairunent. Our consumption of animals thereby 
contributes to the enjoyment and fulfillment 
in life. Consequently, it may seem that the 
issue here is whether the benefit we gain 
fran sacrificing animal interests to fulfill 
our interests outweighs the animal interests 
sacrificed in the process. But once again, 
the issue is not that simple. 
As utilitarians have long been reminding 
us, we must (IOOrally) consider, as far as 
possible and practical, the full range of 
alternative courses of action available to us 
and follow that option which seems likely to 
lead to the greatest excess of enjoyment and 
fulfillment over distress and frustration 
(or to the least excess of distress and frus-
tration over enjoyment and fulfillment). 
Consequently, in addition to estimating the 
contribution to or subtraction fran life's 
excess of enjoyment and fulfillment made by 
the routine sacrifice of aniriial interests for 
our benefit, we must also estimate the con-
tribution or subtraction which would be made 
by liberating animals and either frustrating 
those of our interests which have heretofore 
been fulfilled by the animals' sacrifice or 
employing alternatives to satisfy those inte-
rests. If the latter option would result in 
a greater excess of enjoyment and fulfillment 
over distress and frustration than the for-
mer, or even just a smaller excess of dis-
tress and frustration over enjoyment and 
fulfillment than the fonner, then we would be 
rrorally obligated, on these consequential 
grounds, to favor that alternative. 
Many vegetarians contend that in discus-
sing diet with meat-eaters, they often get 
the impression that the meat-eaters think 
that vegetarians simply rrake do with what is 
left over when we rezoove the meat fran the 
traditional meat, potatoes, and vegetable 
dinner plate. That is certainly not the 
case, as even a cursory glance through a 
vegetarian cookbook or at the menu of a vege-
tarian restaurant will confinn. Thus, our 
way of life following the liberation of ani-
mals would not be one in which a giant hole 
had been cut; rather, it would be a way of 
life in which there would, sooner or later, 
be Substitutions rrost everywhere that there 
were excisions. It is the consequential 
value of such a way of life--theirs as well 
as ours--which must (IOOrally) be ccmpared 
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with the consequential value of our contem-
porary, animal-consuming way of life in order 
to detennine the rroral superiority here of 
animal liberation or continued animal con-
sumption. 
Of course, it' is not possible to give a 
precise, quantitative response to such a 
question. However, the great number of ani-
mals we consume counts heavily here in favor 
of animal liberation. It is estimated that 
in the United States alone we annually con-
sume four to five billion animals, excluding 
fish. If fish are sentient beings, then that 
number quickly jumps to several trillion. 
Virtually all of these animals suffer to one 
degree or another. For our =rent, animal-
consuming, way of life to produce an excess of 
enjoyment and fulfillment over distress and 
frustration, the benefit we receive from 
consuming animals must outweigh this massive 
burden of suffering. Even rrore to the point, 
for our animal-consuming way of life to be 
superior on these grounds to a way of life in 
which animals have been liberated, the loss 
(assuming it would be a loss) that we would 
in= in shifting from consuming animals to 
consuming animal substitutes would have to be 
greater than the benefit that these billions 
or trillions of animals would realize from 
this shift. 
It is hard to imagine that we would lose 
rrore in turning to animal substitutes than 
the animals could gain by being liberated; 
so, it is hard to imagine that liberating 
animals would not lead to a rrorally better 
balance of enjoyment and fulfillment with 
distress and frustration in life than would 
continuing to consume them. There are only 
about 260 million people in the United States 
at present. Consequently, for our =rent 
practice of animal consumption to produce an 
excess of enjoyment and fulfillment over 
distress and frustration, the benefit each of 
us receives, on average, from the consumption 
of animals must outweigh the harm suffered by 
approximately 25 animals annually, if fish 
are not counted, and of over 12,500 animals 
annually, if fish are counted. Furthenrore, 
for animal consumption to be rrorally prefer-
able, on these grounds, to animal liberation, 
the loss each of us would suffer if we had to 
shift to animal substitutes would, on ave-
rage, have to outweigh the benefit that 25 
(or 12,500) animals 'annually could realize 
from that shift. This would seem to place 
the burden of proof squarely on the animal 
consumers' shoulders. 
Perhaps the rrost ambitious attempt to 
date to shoulder this burden has been made by 
R. G. Frey, in Rights, Killing,. and Suffer-
~. In this work, Frey details no less than 
fourteen (supposedly) seriously adverse con-
sequences of eliminating meat eating. Here, 
with same abbreviation, is the last of these: 
(14) Finally, there is the general finan-
cial picture to consider. First, loss of 
tax revenues from all those businesses 
and industries even indirectly associated 
with the meat trade will affect local, 
state, and national budgets and pro-
grammes and will alrrost certainly affect 
export rrarkets and the financing of im-
ports from other industrialized countries 
and the Third World. Second, loss of 
revenues and of earnings by a great many 
people will increase the need for costly 
subsidies and social programmes, which in 
turn seem likely to feed inflationary 
pressures. Third, the loss of investment 
capital and of plant; the loss of in-
come, with consequent effect on rrort-
gages, loans, and credit of all kinds; 
the disruption in canmunity, regional, 
and national economies; the demise of 
savings from individuals who would other-
wise bank them; all these and a great 
many other factors are likely in the 
United States to place some banks, sav-
ings and loan institutions, and loan 
companies in trouble. This in turn af-
fects confidence. Fourth, loss in confi-
dence will be exacerbated as whole busi-
nesses and industries fail or are threa-
tened with going under. Fifth, financial 
storms of the sort in question are bound 
to affect the stock J;narket. A massive 
loss of confidence is likely to be re-
flected by panic in the market. Sixth, 
growth in the economy is likely to cease, 
as whole areas come under intense pres-
sure and confidence is so low as to deter 
investment; besides a great many people 
will be out of work and out of hope, as 
whole industries disappear or con-
tract. [6] 
Little do advocates of animal liberation 
realize that they are pushing us . down the 
slippery slope to Armageddon! More serious-
ly, Frey overlooks alrrost entirely the de-
velopnent of alternatives to animal consump-
tion which would certainly rroderate, if not 
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entirely eliminate, the negative consequences 
he foresees. Indeed, the spectre of these 
fourteen possibilities would itself provide 
adequate incentive quickly to develop alter-
native businesses, industries, occupations, 
and pleasures to replace the losses occa-
sioned by liberating ani.ma.ls. Furthenrore, 
the liberation of ani.ma.ls would likely take 
place gradually, which would also help to 
moderate the negative consequences Frey en-
visages. Finally, the problems Frey outlines 
are, by and large, only transitory disloca-
tions which we would have to go through to 
switch fran an ani.ma.l constuning to a libe-
rated way of life. On the other hand, the 
relief for animal distress and frustration 
attained through liberating animals would go 
on indefinitely. Consequently, as time pro-
gressed, the negative impact of these transi-
tory dislocc1tions would became rrore and rrore 
insignificant in canparison with these accum-
ulating benefits. 
Thus, while Frey is certainly correct 
that liberating animals would have pervasive 
consequences--that is part and parcel of 
animal liberation being a major liberation 
rrovement--he is wrong in thinking that the 
dislocations which would be involved in ac-
complishing this revolution constitute a 
significant objection to the consequential 
superiority of animal liberation over contin-
ued animal constnnption. 
Another, rrore substantive argument 
against the consequential superiority of 
animal liberation over continued animal con-
stnnption is the so-called "replacement argu-
ment." However, since I have dealt with that 
argument at length elsewhere, [7] I shall pass 
over it here and conclude this section by 
responding to the objection that our referen-
ces to the great number of ani.ma.ls which 
would benefit fran animal liberation is mis-
taken. This is because, it has been claimed, 
if we' were no longer permitted to consume 
ani.ma.ls, we would cease to raise them, and, 
consequently, many animals would never exist 
to benefit fran being liberated. 
Such an objection suffers fran tunnel 
vision. While it is likely that liberating 
animals would lead to a substantial reduction 
in the number of chickens, white mice, and 
other animals bred for our constnnption, it is 
also likely that the number of wild animals 
would increase substantially. That increase 
would be due in part to our not needing to 
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The first people knew 
The One Mind in many 
And the many in One. 
The bear was sacred, 
Like the wolf and the deer 
And all creatures of the air and waters. 
The first people knew 
The One Soul in many 
And the many in the One. 
So they lived in harIOClny 
In reverence of all. 
It was a Golden Age. 
Now this Age has gone 
Except in memory 
And in our feeling for the Earth. 
This poem and others by 
Michael W. Fox are from a 
long narrative poem pub-
lished by Bear & Company, 
Tucson, Arizona. 
f arm as much land to support ourselves on a 
vegetarian diet as on a meat diet, thereby 
releasing land for wild animals to live on. 
That increase would also result fran our 
recognizing the right of wild animals to 
their own homeland, thereby halting our con-
tinual ~-xpropriation of their habitats for 
our benefit. [ 8] Furtherrrore, given our rroral 
goal of making life rrore enjoyable and ful-
filling and our ability to care for animals, 
we would be obligated (ceteris paribus) to 
act as nature's caretakers, in order to in-
sure the flourishing of sentient life on 
earth. Consequently, there is no reason to 
believe that liberating ani.ma.ls would leave 
significantly fewer animals to benefit fran 
that liberation. 
Thus, the extensive distress and frus-
tration occasioned by our current consumption 
of animals constitutes a serious obstacle to 
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accomplishing the moral goal of reducing 
suffering in life and otherwise making life 
more enjoyable and fulfilling. To paraphrase 
Winston Churchill, never have so few in-
flicted so llRlch on so many. Eliminating that 
distress and frustration might cause us sane 
transitory frustration; however, it is very 
hard to believe that permanently relieving 
the animals' distress and frustration would 
not outweigh our transitory frustration. 
Consequently, even without considering the 
other ways in which we, as conscientious 
stewards of sentient life on earth, might 
make life more enjoyable and fulfilling for 
us all, human and non-human, it is hard not 
to conclude that liberating animals would be 
a step forward toward accomplishing this 
consequer'ltial goal of morality. 
III 
The third of our COI1IlIOn moral goals is 
to insure that the available goods, opportun-
ities, rewards, and punishments are distribu-
ted fairly. On the face of it, our animal-
constnning way of life seems clearly to de-
tract from making the world a fair place in 
which to live. For example, in order to =e 
our ills, we take healthy, innocent animals 
and inflict painful and mortal diseases on 
them. We also drive animals out of their 
hanes, so that we can enjoy suburban life, 
and crowd them into factory farms, so that we 
can have abundant, inexpensive meat. In 
these and many other ways, we take for our-
selves the available goods of the earth, with 
little, if any, concern for insuring that 
animals receive a fair share of these goods, 
and we destroy (the quality of) their lives 
in our efforts to satisfy our needs and de-
sires. Such treatment of people would be 
considered grossly unjust, and that we no 
longer treat people in these ways we consider 
to be a mark of the moral progress we have 
made toward making the world a fair place. 
It would seem to follow that liberating ani-
mals from such discrimination would be yet a 
further step toward attaining this goal of 
morality. 
Avoiding the conclusion that liberating 
animals would be fairer than continuing to 
consume them requires either showing that the 
concept of fairness cannot be meaningfully 
applied to our dealings with animals or find-
ing reasons for believing that it is fair for 
us routinely to sacrifice animals' interests 
for our benefit. We shall deal with each of 
these strategies in turn. 
Pursuing the former strategy, we could 
try to introduce a restricted definition of 
"fairness" which could not apply to animals, 
e.g., that "fairness" can be an issue only 
within some sort of contractual situation. 
However, such a definition would be artifi-
cial. Consider the case of two hungry men in 
Hobbes' state of nature who simultaneously 
chance upon sane food. Assume that David is 
much stronger than Toby and could take all 
the food for himself with impunity. Now, 
what should the men do? While it would be 
difficult to understand how "David ~ Toby 
half the food" would be a meaningful answer 
to that question in this situation, "The fair 
thing would be for the two men to split the 
food between them" would not be an unintelli-
gible or even an inappropriate answer. That 
answer would reflect the fact that neither 
man has a prior, legal or moral claim on the 
food, that neither man is under a prior abli-
gation to defer to the other, that both are 
in need of the food, and that they would, 
presumably, both benefit (and about equally 
so) from an equal share of the food. 
The same sorts of considerations could 
be raised in a similar situation, where Toby 
was not a weaker man but a hungry dog. It 
follows that even if some of our institution-
alized senses of "fairness" may not apply to 
our dealings with animals, our int~tive 
sense of fairness can be meaningfully applied 
here. When animal liberation advocates talk 
about the unfairness of research animals 
bearing all the burdens while we reap all the 
benefits and about our taking unfair advan-
tage of the fact that we are so llRlch more 
powerful than other animals, we understand 
what they mean, even if we do not agree. 
Consequently, questions about the fairness of 
our constnning animals cannot be dismissed as 
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category mistakes. by us, and 
Turning to the second strategy, we shall 
consider three camonly proposed justifica-
tions for believing that it is fair for us 
to consume anirnals. The first of these is 
that since we brought them into being, they 
aNe their lives to us, and, consequently, it 
is fair for us to dispose of those lives as 
we see fit--provided we do so humanely, of 
course. If we exclude fish, the vast majori-
ty of the animals we consume are bred and 
cared for by us; so, it is claimed, when we 
choose to consume them, we are simply exer-
cising our end of the bargain. Being con-
sumed is the only way these animals have of 
repaying what we have given them, thereby 
acquitting themselves of the debt they owe 
us. Thus, there is an inter-species varia-
tion of the social contract theory at work in 
our CCIllm:Jn attitude taNard animals; let us 
label this "the natural contract." 
An obvious problem with citing the na-
tural contract in defense of our consuming 
animals is that when dealing with people, it 
does not follaN that because we brought them 
into existence and have cared for them, we 
are entitled to dispose of their lives for 
our benefit; so, it does not seem fair that 
animals should have to pay with their lives 
for similar benefits. The group of people to 
which the logic of the. natural contract would 
obviously apply is children, rrost of whom 
were brought into existence intentionally by 
their parents, who also care for them. While 
we hold that children thereby incur obliga-
tions to their parents, we no longer conclude 
that parents are entitled to dispose of their 
children's lives, although this conclusion 
was not unCClllm:Jn in the past, especially when 
the children in question were female. [9] 
Today, children have been liberated fran the 
natural contract, and we regard this as yet 
another step forward in our rroral progress. 
Consequently, sane justification is needed 
for not liberating animals fran the natural 
contract; so, citing that contract cannot 
provide a justification for our continuing to 
consume animals. 
Another of the rrost CCIllm:Jn responses to 
animal liberation arguments is "But animals 
eat other. anilllals." This phrase seems to 
have a double meaning: 
since animals consume other animals, 
they do not deserve to be treated any better 
since one species consuming another is a 
standard, even essential, part of the natural 
order, we are merely taking our place in 
nature and making our contribution to the 
natural .cycle of life on earth when we con-
sume other animals. 
We shall call these the "Let them reap what 
they SaN!" and the "It's only natural!" 
defenses of our consuming animals and shall 
take up each of them in turn. 
Of course, it is irmnediately aIlUlsing 
when the "Let them reap what they SaN!" de-
fense is offered in support of our consuming 
cattle, sheep, hogs, rabbits, and other 
herbivorous animals. It is also striking 
that when animals occasionally turn the 
tables and prey on us, e.g., shark and bear 
attacks, we do not resignedly say "I guess 
we, too, have to reap what we SaN." Rather,· 
we usually brand such ani.ma.ls "renegades," 
"rron~ters," or even "murderers" and go after 
tL'1em in a vengeful and punitive manner. Ap-
parently, we' feel that if we do the reaping, 
that balances the books, but if we are the 
prey, then sane punishment is needed to 
balance those books. This situation is fur-
ther confused by our often regarding animals 
as incapable of recognizing and responding to 
rroral obligations. It follows that their 
predation cannot consistently be considered 
to be something like a crime for which they 
can be expected to suffer the just conseguen-
ces. 
Finally, it can be noted that animal 
predation is usually properly described as 
"doing what they Imlst in order to survive." 
So, if it is "only fair" for us to treat 
ani111als as they treat each other, then we 
should limit our consumption of them to 
"doing what we must in order to survive." 
Given our many frivolous uses of animals and 
the vast array of alternatives to animal 
consumption which we already have or could 
develop, our consumption of animals goes far 
beyond that limit. Consequently, the "Let 
them reap what they SaN!" justification of 
why it is fair for us to consume animals is 
not only a confused but also an insufficient 
excuse for our continuing to consume animals. 
Turning to the "It' s only natural! " 
argument, this defense has often been fonnu-
lated in tenus of a natural hierarchy in 
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which certain life forms are, supposedly, 
intended for the use of others, e.g., plants 
being intended for animal consumption and 
animals being intended for human consumption. 
However, David Hume and Charles Darwin have 
made it difficult to develop the argument in 
this way without an embarrassed smile. Per-
haps because of this, the offending reference 
to natural purpose is today usually replaced 
by a phrase like "the natural order of 
things:" big fi~ eat litUe fish, and as 
the nost powerful species on this planet, we 
are simply carrying on the natural order of 
things by using other species for our bene-
fit. 
However, whether we develop this idea 
fran a teleological or an evolutionary per-
spective, what we are defending is the prac-
tice of the stronger routinely sacrificing 
the interests of the weaker for their (the 
stronger's) benefit. Today, such practice is 
not considered fair in dealings among humans, 
to p.J.t it mildly. This was not always the 
case, for humans-over-animals is not the only 
"natural hierarchy" that has been proposed. 
AristoUe thought that men were naturally 
superior to women, and Victorians thought 
MICHAEL W. FOX 
'!he men were gentle, the women strong 
And the children knew no wrong. 
'!'he young shared fears and longings 
And all their dreams. 
There was no separation of one soul 
From anotheri all was one in spirit. 
The elders gave the oral histories 
Of past 1ives, past ancestors 
Birthing the living whole 
Of their eternal present. 
They could recall lives past 
That were not in human fonn 
And foretold of future lives 
That were beyond the reabn 
Of this time and place 
Yet were being born therein. 
So they lived in that dimension 
Of clear vision where space and time 
Made one eternal present 
In the all-abiding mind. 
The first words shared 
Gave names to things experienced 
And in this naming 
Came the knowing of Nature, 
And the deepening of the self. 
white men had to shoulder the burden of being 
superior to savages. We have cane to reject 
these and many other supposedly natural hier-
archiesi the history of what we consider 
noral progress can be viewed as, in large 
part, the replacement of hierarchical world-
views with a presumption in favor of forms of 
egalitarianism. This substitution places the 
burden of proof on those who would deny equal 
consideration to the interests of all con-
cerned. Consequently, sane reason is needed 
to justify the fairness of maintaining a 
hierarchical worldview when we are dealing 
with animals. 
calling the humans-over-animals hierar-
chy "natural" will not suffice. The long 
history of our conquest and enslavement of 
other humans indicates that it is also "na-
tural" for us to engage in these discrimina-
tory practices with other people. If its 
being natural is not sufficient reason IOOral-
ly to justify our conquering and enslaving 
other people, then its being natural is not 
sufficient norally to justify our consuming 
animals. 
F'UrtherIOOre, as John Rawls has noted, 
one of the primary purposes of principles of 
justice is to correct "the arbitrariness of 
this world. "[10] "Arbitrariness" here re-
fers, anong other things, to the great dif-
ferences in power that occur naturally anong 
people. To protect the weak against the 
strong among us is one of the primary reasons 
we develop principles of justice. But there 
are also great differences in power between 
us and animals, differences of which we take 
advantage in order to consume them. Since 
"the arbitrariness of this world" is not 
limited to the human condition and intra-
human relations, it would seem to fo1101'17 that 
since correcting such arbitrariness is a 
fundamental noral concern, we should develop 
principles of justice to protect animals fran 
our taking unfair advantage of their weak-
ness. At the very least, since principles of 
fairness are intended to work against the 
natural order of the stronger benefiting by 
sacrificing the weaker, simply intoning "But 
it's the natural order of thingsl" cannot 
(logically) show why IOOrality should not work 
against the humans-over-animals hierarchy. 
It could be objected, follOl'l7ing sane-
thing like the logic of Rawls' analysis of 
justice, particularly his proposed "original 
position," that noral concern with the inte-
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rests of the weak derives fran our self-
interest and the possibility that we might 
becane one of the weak. [11] "There, but for 
the grace of God, go II" is the IlK)tive for 
fairness in this IlK)ral scheme. So, it could 
be argued that since we need not fear becan-
ing cattle, Rhesus IlK)nkeys, etc., this IlK)tive 
cannot be extended to cover our dealings with 
anirrals. 
In response, we may note that, like 
other proposed egoistic origins for IlK)rality, 
this one fails to distinguish IlK)rality fran 
prudence and does not fit with everyday IlK)ral 
psychology. For example, my IlK)ral outrage at 
the injustice of the apartheid policies in 
South Africa does not derive fran any concern 
I have about becoming a South. African black. 
There is no IlK)re chance of that happening 
than there is· of my becoming a Rhesus IlK)nkey. 
In my own case, and I do not think that I am 
unusual in this, it is not any sort of self-
interest but something like David Hume' s 
"disinterested sent:irnent" or a deontological 
sense of fairness being intrinsically valu-
able which is the origin of my IlK)ral concern 
about injustices in South Africa and other 
parts of the world remote fran my daily life. 
Thus, self-interest does not set the boundar-
ies of our concern with justice. 
Similarly, if, as seems to be presumed 
in the construction of Rawls' original posi-
tion, the merely logical possibility that I 
might have been born a South African black is 
sanehow of importance for developing the 
principles of justice which I should respect, 
then the same sort of merely logical possibi-
lity that I might have been born a Rhesus 
IlK)nkey or some other animal should suffice to 
extend these principles of justice to ani-
mals. Although the "people" in Rawls' origi-
nal position are gifted with considerable 
information and reasoning ability, it does 
not follow that their principles of justice 
apply only to the informed and the intelli-
gent. Those principles are to cover even 
"the least aIlK)ng us," and this opens the door 
to animals being aIlK)ng the possible incarna-
tions which those in the original position 
must (logically) be prudentially concerned to 
have protected against exploitation. It will 
not do to object that we cannot know "what it 
is like to be a bat," to use Tool Nagel •s 
famous example, and, therefore, cannot deter-
mine exactly what is needed to protect ani-
mals' interests against abuse. Even if we 
cannot directly experience the pleasures of 
other life forms, we can, if we will make the 
effort to observe anirrals closely, cane to 
understand which ways of life provide them 
IlK)re enjoyment and fulfillment, and such 
corrunon sensical understanding is all that is 
required for the protective reflections car-
ried on in the original position. [12] There-
fore, Rawls' analysis of the original posi-
tion does not provide a basis for refusing to 
extend our IlK)ral concern with correcting the 
arbitrariness of nature to our relations with 
animals. 
MICHAEL W. FOX 
lEach word expressed an aspect 
Of the Mind incarnate 
In all things that were named. 
Language was sacred and sanctifying. 
For in its beginning there was the word 
And the living word was God. 
In every word that was a name 
There was also divinity: 
Stone, bone, soil and seed 
Were holy things 
Like water, fire and wind, 
All aspects of the living whole 
Whose spirit breathed in sacred places; 
In the valleys, deserts, IlK)untains, 
Forests, oceans, lakes and rivers, 
And in all living things 
Called, recalled and known by name. 
In the naming of these things 
They were incorporated into the human mind, 
And the sanctity of being 
Was experienced in word and song and prayer.  
Consequently, the egoistic dimension in 
Rawls • theory of justice does not provide 
good reason to believe that our IlK)ral concern 
with protecting the weak against the strong 
and other issues of justice must (logically) 
be restricted to intra-human relations. Un-
less sane other, IlK)rally significant justi-
fication can be provided for respecting the 
natural order which leaves us the strongest 
species, that order is no less arbitrary and 
no less in need of correction by principles 
of justice than were the "natural" hierar-
chies envision by Aristotle and the Victori-
ans. 
Thus, the apparent unfairness of our 
consuming animals is not shown to be ·mere 
appearance by the natural contl::act, the na-
tural order, or the idea that animals should 
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reap what they saw. Perhaps what llOst sharp-
ly separates the new animal rights llOvement 
fran the traditional animal welfare llOvement 
is the new llOvement I s insistence that no 
matter how humanely we do it, our continuing 
routinely to sacrifice animals' interests for 
our benefit is unfair. That claim has still 
to be rebutted, if it can be. 
'!hus, liberating animals fran ow: rou-
tine SaCL"ltlce of their interests for ow:: 
benefit would seaT! to be the right thiiY,j" to 
do in order better to pursue our moral goals 
of developing rroral virtues, reducing suffer-
ing, and being fair. 
I began this essay by noting what I 
believe to be the cannon feeling underlying 
opposition to animal liberation. Hopefully, 
the arguments of this essay are strong enough 
at least to indicate that that feeling cannot 
simply be trusted. Hopefully, these argu-
ments have shown that even though .. current, 
camnon rrorality does not question our consum-
ing animals--provided the sacrifice is execu-
ted humanely--there are fundamental elements 
of that morality which point in the direction 
of animal liberation. If that is correct, 
then there are fundamental reasons for ques-
tioning the feeling that we are obviously 
justified in consuming animals and for re-
quiring that some llOre substantive justifica-
tion be offered, if we are going to continue 
to consume animals. 
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